Famine, Affluence, and Morality

The essay “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” was first published by Peter Singer in 1972 in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs. Singer had just completed his graduate studies at Oxford University, and was responding to weather- and war-related crises in Bangladesh that resulted in a large number of refugees lacking adequate food, housing, and medical attention. The essay is a critical examination of the obligations that both individuals and governments in wealthy nations have to alleviate suffering in poorer nations. This guide uses the reprint of the essay found in the book by the same name, published in 2016 by Oxford University Press.

Singer begins by the stating the facts of the crisis in Bangladesh, then asserting that rich nations could virtually make the problems disappear and choose not to. He calls for changing our ethical framework, writing that “the whole way we look at moral issues—our moral conceptual scheme—needs to be altered” (4).

Singer posits that all but a miniscule percentage of people would agree with the basic assumption that the suffering caused by the conditions facing Bangladeshis is bad. He then asserts that if we can stop something bad from occurring, “without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,” we should do it (5-6). Singer illustrates this concept with the example of someone coming across a small child drowning in a shallow pond. That person, the author argues, should of course walk in and save the child: Saving a life is far more significant than keeping one’s shoes clean and dry. Singer next argues that the same principle should hold true regardless of the distance one is from the person in need: Because modern advances in communication and transportation have made distance moot, if one could act to save someone far way, one should do it. Singer adds that even if many people are in a position to help, each individual is still equally responsible for doing so: If many people see the drowning child and do nothing, that doesn’t absolve you of your obligation to save the child.

Singer next qualifies his initial proposition, qualifying it just a bit to make it even easier to accept. Instead of using the standard of “comparable moral importance,” we should act to prevent something bad as long as it doesn’t sacrifice anything “morally significant” (14). This, however, is still a radical change in thinking, as it upends the relationship between duty and charity. Traditionally, freely giving some of your own money to help another person has not been seen as a duty. However, Singer’s logic means that giving money we don’t need to someone who does is a duty and an obligation—a change that comes with a transformation of our cultural ethos, since instead of rewarding the charitable we would now instead criticize those who don’t give.

Singer dismisses those who might say that condemning people for not performing this duty is too drastic a change from our established norms: “the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion” (17). He also counters the possible objection that we should save our opprobrium for the violation of real taboos, like murder; it may be too much to expect people to follow established norms regarding such serious matters and less serious things, like voluntary giving. In response, Singer notes that people rise to the level of expectations. If nobody donates more than 5% of their income, then donating 50% would indeed seem odd. Not so, however, if everyone donated half as a matter of course.

Another common objection against utilitarian ideas like Singer’s is that accepting utilitarianism would force us to work full time to increase the amount of good in the world. Singer’s answer is twofold: First, since his principle uses a standard to reach a certain threshold before acting, this wouldn’t necessarily apply; second, given the state of the world, we may indeed need to work full time. To him, this is a problem with our current norms, not with his proposal. Finally, to those who would say his principle is out of touch with the reality of how people have always approached giving, Singer quotes the Italian philosopher and Dominican friar St. Thomas Aquinas: “whatever a man has in superabundance is owed, of natural right, to the poor for their sustenance” (23).

A more practical objection questions whether the best way to solve the problem of worldwide suffering is through individual action. Shouldn’t we leave it to governments? Singer counters that would only be true if when individuals contributed less, governments automatically contributed more—an unfounded assumption. In fact, the opposite relationship is more likely: If governments see their citizens give very little, they might assume no one cares about suffering and reduce the amount of their foreign aid.

Singer next addresses the assertion that dealing with overpopulation is more important, because helping those in immediate need ignores the fact that they might starve later. This likely contingency, Singer asserts, doesn’t mean we shouldn’t help those in need now, while focusing on population control in the long term.

Singer now moves to logistics: how much to give. Strictly following his principle, we should all give to the point of “marginal utility” (28), namely when our giving adversely affects our own well-being. He is in favor of this, but concedes that this is a subjective qualifier that would have to be more precisely determined. In any case, an important element is reducing the influence of consumer culture, which encourages people to spend money on frivolous things. One positive sign is that people are beginning to question whether economic growth as an unqualified good; however, we should be wary of slowing down the economy too much, since that could result in less money with which to relieve suffering.

Singer concludes by calling on philosophy teachers and students to lead the way. While philosophers are sometimes criticized for their lack of expertise in any given field, they should do their part to take ownership of this cut-and-dried subject, bringing together theory and practice.